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Abstract 
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay schemes and relative 
performance feedback policies on employee effort. We explore three feedback rules: No 
feedback on relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and 
continuously updated feedback. We use two pay schemes, a piece rate and a tournament.  We 
find that overall feedback does not improve performance.  In contrast to the piece-rate pay 
scheme there is in tournaments some evidence of positive peer effects in tournaments since 
the underdogs almost never quit the competition even when lagging significantly behind, and 
front runners do not slack off.  But in both pay schemes relative performance feedback 
reduces the quality of the low performers’ work; we refer to this as a “negative quality peer 
effect”.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect of the strategy of most organizations is the provision of incentives to 
the employees to meet the organization’s objectives.  Typically this implies tying pay to 
performance (see Prendergast, 1999). In order to reward employees for their effort, firms 
spend considerable resources on performance evaluations.  In many cases, evaluation consists 
of comparing actual performance to a predefined individual target.  Another frequently used 
format is relative performance evaluation. Relative performance evaluation may motivate 
employees to work harder.  But it may also be demoralizing and create an excessively 
competitive workplace, which may hinder overall performance; see Lazear (1989).  
Determining the overall impact of relative performance evaluation is crucial for companies.  
Economic research on relative performance evaluation has mainly focused on the comparison 
of final performances between competitors, like in tournament theory, and on quantitative and 
subjective performance ratings (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009).  In contrast, what happens during a 
competition and the impact of feedback frequency on effort have so far received little 
attention in the literature.  The aim of this study is to add to this literature.   
 We address two issues.  How intensively should the organization provide its employees 
with feedback on their relative performance, when the organization’s objective is to maximize 
the employees’ output?  How does the answer to this question depend on the pay scheme in 
use? We examine these questions experimentally by studying individuals’ performance under 
a piece rate and a tournament pay scheme, and under three feedback rules, namely no 
feedback, feedback given half-way during the production period, and continuous feedback on 
relative performance. Which combination of pay scheme and feedback rule yields the highest 
output and profit?  
Pay and relative performance feedback are crucial aspects of organizational design.  First, 
feedback on fellow employees’ performance is likely to matter when the organization uses 
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pay schemes like tournaments.  In such settings the organization must decide whether to 
inform employees about their relative standing during the competition, or to let them remain 
ignorant until the end.  On the one hand, an agent who is informed he is an underdog may be 
discouraged and even quit the job.  And a front runner who learns that he is well ahead of the 
other contestants may think that he can afford to slack off.  In both cases, performance 
declines.  On the other hand, it is possible that an informed underdog works harder than when 
uninformed, in order to preserve pride and avoid shame, and that an informed front runner 
becomes more enthusiastic and increases effort.  In this case feedback leads to better 
performance.  Only a few theoretical models have analyzed these issues and they usually 
conclude that it is best not to give feedback on relative performance (see e.g., Lizzeri et al., 
2002, on the impact of feedback on the agent’s own performance on effort, and Ederer, 2004, 
on the impact of feedback on relative performance).1  The empirical literature on the 
magnitude of these effects is scant and the current paper is one of the first attempts to provide 
some empirical evidence on the impact of feedback on performance in the context of 
performance-pay.2 
 Second, feedback on relative performance has been found to influence behavior even when 
conventional economic analysis says it should not matter.  Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas 
and Moretti (2009) show that allowing people to observe each other’s performance has a 
positive influence on an employee’s performance although her payment is independent of the 
others’ performance.  This is attributed to positive peer effects (see Kandel and Lazear, 1992), 
according to which employees adjust their effort to the co-worker’s effort, due to non-
                                                
1 See Goltsman and Mukherjee (2008) on the differentiation of announcements according to the agents’ 
difference in ability, Yildirim (2005) on optimal interim revelation of ability by the agents themselves, Ertac 
(2005) on the information derived by the agents from the feedback given about the other agents, and Gershkov 
and Perry (2009) on the optimal aggregation rule between the midterm and final reviews. Another strand of the 
literature focuses on biased feedback. An early treatment of whether an organization can benefit for distorting 
information is Gibbs (1991); see Gürtler and Harbring (2007) for experimental evidence.  
2 The management literature, see e.g., Milkovich and Newman (1996), has a clear message: revealing true 
performance information to the employee is bad. The standard explanation, based on psychology and politics, is 
that the information creates animosity among employees and hurts morale. 
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monetary reasons such as social pressure, fear of informal sanctions, and shame. In this paper 
we use a similar definition of peer effects.  Social psychologists have documented many non-
monetary effects of relative performance feedback; see for example Kluger and Denisi (1996).  
Economists have recently started to formally model how peer effects interact with monetary 
incentives (see e.g. Kräkel, 2007).   
   What is the role of the pay scheme and relative performance feedback for performance and 
profit? If providing feedback on relative performance makes a difference, how is this 
decomposed into the separate impacts on underdogs and on front runners?  Are the positive 
peer effects that have been documented for performance-independent pay schemes (Falk and 
Ichino, 2006 and Mas and Moretti, 2009) also present in performance-pay schemes or are they 
crowded out by the stronger monetary incentives?  Our paper sheds empirical light on these 
issues.  Since it is difficult to get suitable data from real organizations we conduct a 
laboratory experiment.3  We find that on the whole, feedback on relative performance, 
regardless of the performance-pay scheme used, does not improve performance.  Neither 
discrete nor continuous feedback on relative performance generates positive peer effects in 
the piece-rate pay scheme.  Additional experimental sessions indicate, however, that this 
absence of peer effects in the piece rate pay scheme may be due to subjects exerting 
maximum effort given their ability, in which case there is little room for positive effects to 
manifest themselves.  In contrast, we find evidence of positive peer effects in the 
tournaments: front runners do not slack off and underdogs almost never quit the competition, 
even when lagging significantly behind. These effects are however not sufficient to improve 
overall performance when compared to an environment with no feedback.  In addition, in both 
pay schemes there is what we call a negative ‘quality peer effect’: feedback on relative 
performance has a negative effect on scores, not because it causes the less able performers to 
                                                
3 Notable exceptions are Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005), Lazear (1992), and Mas and Moretti (2009). 
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work less hard but because they make more mistakes. We believe our experiment is the first 
to provide evidence on how feedback can affect not only the quantity but also the quality of 
agents’ effort. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on feedback.  
Section 3 describes the experimental design and formulates some hypotheses. The data are 
analyzed in Section 4 and Section 5 discusses our results and concludes.             
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2009) examine the impact of feedback on 
relative performance on effort in settings with a flat wage pay scheme. Both studies find 
significant positive peer effects.  In the first study subjects stuff envelopes in exchange for a 
fixed payment.  Subjects either work alone or work in pairs where each subject can see the 
other’s output.  Falk and Ichino observe that output is higher in the latter case and interpret 
this as evidence of positive peer effects. Their data are consistent with a model where workers 
experience disutility when they fall behind their fellow workers.   
   Mas and Moretti examine peer effects in settings where super market cashiers are affected 
by other workers’ performance through externalities. Each cashier works and is paid 
independently of each other, but has an incentive to free ride by unloading the workload on to 
the other workers.  The data show that more productive workers induce an increase in 
productivity of fellow employees, but only significantly so when the workers can observe 
each other’s output.  This is consistent with peer effects being social pressure (including 
mutual monitoring or informal sanctions).  
The two papers described above use a flat wage pay scheme. We empirically examine 
whether or not peer effects are present when the organization uses performance-pay.  The few 
studies that have considered the influence of competitors’ ability on own effort have produced 
mixed evidence; see Haraguchi and Waddell, 2007, Guryan et al. 2009, and Ludwig and 
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Lünser, 2009. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) find that when a relative pay scheme is 
used, a worker’s productivity is affected by her co-workers’ productivity as the negative 
externality is internalized, but only when mutual monitoring is possible.  
   Ederer and Fehr (2007) set up a two-period tournament experiment where a principal can at 
no cost give potentially incorrect feedback on the relative performance of two workers. 
Feedback is provided at the end of period 1, after which workers decide on their period 2 
effort.  In a second treatment feedback is always correct and in a third treatment no feedback 
is given. According to their theoretical analysis, if marginal cost is linear (convex) [concave] 
then period 2 effort under accurate feedback is the same as (lower than) [higher than] under 
no feedback. Like Ederer and Fehr we compare tournaments with no feedback and with 
feedback, but in our experiment feedback is always correct.  In addition, we study the case 
where feedback is given continuously.  This allows us to identify the potential influence of the 
frequency of feedback on behavior. Moreover, whereas the subjects in Ederer and Fehr’s 
experiment choose abstract effort levels our subjects work on a real task. While we thereby 
lose experimental control over the cost of effort, it allows us to observe the dynamics of effort 
over time in the Continuous Feedback treatment, where workers are constantly kept updated 
on relative performance. Finally, since our real task allows us to measure how many errors the 
subjects make we can investigate the extent to which feedback affects performance for given 
effort, which in turn provides us with a simple measure of the quality of effort.  
   Some papers have investigated tournaments where one contestant is exogenously favored 
over another player (Schotter and Weigelt, 1992, Kräkel, 2007).  They find that the 
disadvantaged contestant does not frequently drop out and chooses a larger effort than 
predicted by theory.  In contrast, Müller and Schotter (2007) find that low-ability workers 
drop out when promotion opportunities are limited.  We do not exogenously impose 
differences between contestants.  Instead, such differences emerge endogenously as players 
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exert effort and observe their relative positions.  We feel that using such a dynamic 
experiment provides a better framework for studying quitting decisions.   
   Fershtman and Gneezy (2005) study quitting behavior by conducting an experiment with 
students running athletics races. The monetary stakes were manipulated and the tournaments 
were either direct (runners ran side by side) or indirect (subjects ran separately).  The latter 
distinction is similar to our No Feedback and Continuous Feedback treatments.  It is found 
that it does not matter for performance whether the tournament is direct or indirect, but there 
is less quitting in the indirect tournament.  Dropping out occurs only when incentives are 
strong.  The low drop out rate is attributed to shame due to the presence of an audience.  Our 
paper studies quitting in settings where subjects receive a feedback on relative performance 
but there is no audience.  
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
3.1. Procedures  
Our experiment uses a real task that consists of adding sets of four randomly generated two- 
digit numbers for 20 minutes.  All the subjects in all sessions receive the same numbers in the 
same order.  This task is similar to the one used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). We chose 
the task because it is simple, we expected it to be gender-neutral4, it requires effort 
(concentration) but not learning, the outcome is easy to measure, and it provides us with a 
simple measure of the quality of effort (wrong versus correct answers).  The subjects see the 
numbers on the computer screen and enter the answer using the keyboard.  Use of a pen, 
scratch paper, or calculator is not allowed.  Once an answer has been submitted, a new set of 
numbers appears on the screen.  Each subject can work at his own pace.  The screen displays 
the number of correct answers and the remaining time available.  
   If in a tournament a competitor feels he is certain to lose he may decide that it is not 
                                                
4 Gender neutrality is confirmed by our experiment where scores do not differ across gender (p=0.363). 
 7 
worthwhile to continue performing the task.  But simply sitting still in the lab may not be an 
attractive alternative either.  We made a newspaper available on each desk and informed the 
subjects that they were free to read this newspaper, or any book that they had brought with 
them.  A subject could read for as much and as long as they wished, and they could resume 
work if they so desired.   
Pay schemes   
We randomly matched subjects in pairs.  In the Piece Rate pay scheme a subject’s earnings 
only depend on the subject’s own score (number of correct answers).  Each correct answer 
pays 1 point (10 points=!1).  There is no penalty for wrong answers.  In the Tournament pay 
scheme a subject's earnings depend on the relative performance.  The subject with the highest 
score receives a fixed winner’s prize of !17 and the other subject receives !0.  In case of ties 
the winner is randomly selected and the other subject receives nothing.   
Feedback rules     
Subjects always know their own current score but the information they get about the other 
subject’s score depends on the feedback rule. Under the No Feedback rule a subject never 
observes the other subject’s performance.  Under the Discrete Feedback rule each subject is 
informed about the other subject’s score halfway during the production period, that is, when 
10 minutes have elapsed; after that no further feedback is given before the end of the game.  
According to the Continuous Feedback rule each subject is continuously informed about the 
other subject’s score.  Regardless of the feedback rule a subject observes the other’s score 
after the 20 minutes have elapsed, except in the Piece Rate No - Feedback treatment, and in 
the Tournament pay scheme he is also told if he won or lost.  All the above is public 
information. Appendix 1 contains a screen shot. All in all, we therefore have 2x3=6 
treatments, of the form (x,z), where x=PR (Piece Rate), T (Tournament), and z=NF (No 
Feedback), DF (Discrete Feedback), CF (Continuous Feedback). 
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Choosing Piece Rate and Tournament parameters   
To enable profitability comparisons across treatments we chose the parameters of the 
treatments (per unit payment and prizes) such that the expected wage cost of an employee is 
the same under both the Piece Rate and Tournament pay schemes.  To do this we first fixed 
the piece rate, b, and ran the Piece Rate - No Feedback treatment.  The average observed 
output from this treatment, denoted , determines an average wage, b , which was 
approximately equal to !8.5.  We used the same average wage cost in the tournaments, by 
setting the loser's prize equal to zero and setting the winner's prize equal to 2x!8.5=!17.  This 
equalizes the expected wage cost per worker-pair in the Tournament and in the Piece Rate pay 
schemes, assuming that feedback has no impact on output in the Piece Rate pay scheme. This, 
in turn, implies that profitability differences exactly reflect differences in scores.   
Experimental procedure  
The experiment was conducted at the GATE laboratory in Lyon, France, using the REGATE 
software (Zeiliger, 2000). 208 undergraduate students from local business and engineering 
schools (101 males and 107 females) were recruited by means of the ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2004).  Eight sessions were organized.  Each subject participated in a single session 
only.  Table 1 summarizes the treatments. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Upon arrival the subjects were randomly assigned to a computer.  The instructions, 
describing the nature of the task, the money payoffs and the nature of feedback were 
distributed and read aloud (they are available from the authors upon request).  The subjects 
completed a questionnaire in order to check their understanding.  They practiced the task for 
three minutes without payment so they could become familiar with the screen display and the 
task. Next, each subject was randomly matched with another subject and performed the task 
for a maximum of 20 minutes, with or without feedback on the co-worker's score, depending 
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on the feedback rule. A session lasted on average 75 minutes. Subjects received a show-up fee 
of !7.  On average the subjects earned ! 15.41 (min=!7; max=!24).  Subjects were paid in 
cash in a separate room. 
3.2. Predictions  
In this section we formulate some hypotheses about the behavior we expect to see in our 
treatments.  Our objective is not to set up and test a theoretical model.  Any such attempt 
would ultimately be unsuccessful since in our real effort experiment we do not have full 
experimental control over the parameters which according to theory are important, such as the 
cost of effort.  Our experiment empirically elucidates how individuals react to interim 
feedback in dynamic environments. 
Peer effects    
By peer effects we understand a change in people’s submissions due to non-monetary 
reasons triggered from observing other agents’ scores.  People may compare their score with 
reference agents, and it can be subjectively costly to be out of line with them (Kandel and 
Lazear, 1992; Kräkel, 2007).  If peer effects are positive then lagging behind a reference agent 
is unpleasant, and in order to avoid this feeling the agent increases effort in order to catch up 
with the other agent.  Similarly, outperforming others is pleasant, and the agent seeks to 
increase his distance with the other agent.  If in contrast  peer effects are negative, lagging 
behind leads to discouragement and the agent reduces effort, or even quits although it may in 
terms of maximization of expected money earnings be rational to continue exerting effort.    
As Falk and Ichino (2006) we think of peer effects as affecting the marginal cost of effort. 
Peer effects are positive if a person’s marginal cost of effort falls when the other agent 
increases his score.  They are negative if her marginal cost of effort increases when the other 
agent improves his score.  Ceteris paribus, positive peer effects lead the agent to increase her 
submissions whereas negative peer effects lead her to reduce them.  
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 Positive peer effects, and indeed any predicted effort response to changes in the 
exogenous parameters, can only occur if agents are not already exerting maximum effort. This 
is an important qualifier, because in any real effort experiment an interior solution cannot 
simply be assumed.  We allow our subjects to freely decide on their submissions and an 
alternative activity exists (reading newspapers or doing nothing), but agents may have exerted 
maximum effort (a corner solution), constrained by their ability level. We address this issue in 
Section 4.1 below.5  
Since the subjects belong to the same pool of students and are randomly allocated to the 
various treatments, the ability distributions across treatments are assumed to be the same.6  
Consequently, observed differences in submissions across treatments will reflect differences 
in effort, not in ability. 
 Keeping these observations in mind, we proxy effort by the number of submitted answers.  
If an answer is false no output is produced: only correct answers generate scores.7  In other 
words,  effort (submitted answers) = score (correct answers) + mistakes (incorrect answers). 
An increase in submissions will not be accompanied by a similar increase in scores if the 
number of mistakes also increases. In our experiment there is therefore an additional potential 
peer effect, which affects the ‘quality’ of effort, namely the extent to which a given effort is 
translated into scores.  In the rest of the paper, ‘peer effect’ refers to the peer effect operating 
on the quantity of submissions, and we refer to the one operating on quality as a ‘quality peer 
effect’.  The quality peer effect is defined as being negative when an increase in the other 
agent’s score leads the agent to make more mistakes.  A positive quality peer effect means 
                                                
5 On the relative roles of effort and ability, see Arvey (1972), and the psychology literature on motivation, and 
expectancy theory in particular, cited therein.  
6 For the same reason, we do not expect there to be systematic differences in the subjects’ psychological traits 
across treatments.  
7 We assume here that mistakes are not due to a lack of effort since if they are not willing to put much effort in 
the task, the subjects can simply work more slowly or even stop working, which both should reduce the number 
of mistakes.  In contrast, putting more effort in the task, i.e., trying to submit more answers within the time span, 
may result in subjects making more mistakes because this requires more concentration. 
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that the agent makes relatively fewer mistakes.8 We expect the quality peer effect to be 
predominantly negative.  
The Piece Rate pay scheme  
There is no strategic interaction between the agents under the Piece Rate pay scheme, so a  
prediction based on standard assumptions is that each agent’s behavior is the same regardless 
of the feedback policy.   
Prediction 1: Suppose there are no peer effects. Then the average number of submissions and 
scores in the PR-NF, PR-DF, and PR-CF treatments are the same. 
Consider next peer effects.  Positive (negative) peer effects in the Piece Rate pay scheme 
means that a person’s optimal choice of submissions is increasing (decreasing) in the other 
person’s score.  Of course it is not possible to give clean theoretical results without knowing 
the shape of the cost of effort function.  We instead predict that in the PR-DF treatment there 
will be sufficient evidence for positive peer effects if subjects’ period 2 submissions are 
observed to be increasing in the other subjects’ period 1 score, provided a limit is not imposed 
by their ability level.9 The presence of positive (negative) peer effects should increase 
(decrease) the overall number of submissions relative to the PR-NF treatment.  To sum up: 
Prediction 2: Suppose there are positive peer effects. Then in the PR-DF treatment subjects’ 
period 2 submissions and scores will be increasing in the other subjects’ period 1 scores.  
 By extension, we predict that peer effects, if they exist, should have a stronger impact in the 
PR-CF treatment since subjects receive more frequent feedback on their relative position than 
                                                
8 As for the ‘normal’ peer effect, it seems natural to define the quality peer effect as the impact on behavior that 
arises from changes in the marginal cost of some variable that is related to the quality of effort (the likelihood 
with which the person submits an incorrect answer). But, of course, in order to do this we would need first to 
construct a model where the agent also decides on the quality of effort, and where the agents’ payoff function 
contains a cost term such as the “cost of concentration”, or the “cost of being careful”. It would be interesting to 
construct such a model since it would allow us to study the nature of the agents’ quantity-quality tradeoff, but 
this is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
9 This follows from recalling that positive peer effects means that an increase in the other person’s score lowers 
the agent’s marginal cost of effort and hence raises the agent’s optimal level of submissions. The agent’s period 
2 best reply level of submissions will therefore be increasing in the other agent’s period 1 score.  
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in the PR-DF treatment.   
As remarked above, while the pattern described in Prediction 2 is sufficient to conclude that 
positive peer effects exist, it is not a necessary condition due to the possibility of a corner 
solution.  
The Tournament pay scheme  
We shall use the following terminology for the Tournament with Discrete Feedback: agent i is 
the 'front runner' if the subject's period 1 output was the highest,  and agent j is the ‘underdog’ 
if his period 1 output was the lowest.  Ederer and Fehr (2007) compare a tournament with no 
feedback with one where agents receive feedback on relative performance halfway through 
the experiment. Thus, their set-up matches our experimental No Feedback and Discrete 
Feedback treatments, except for the fact that in our experiment we do not introduce 
stochastics since this could make the task less transparent for the subjects.  Nevertheless, we 
use the result in Ederer and Fehr (2007) as a benchmark for our own hypotheses. They obtain 
the following result: In the T-DF treatment and in the absence of peer effects both the front 
runner and the underdog’s period 2 submissions and scores are decreasing in the period 1 
score gap.  
   Consider next the impact of peer effects.  In the T-DF or T-CF treatments, when an 
underdog learns he is lagging behind the front runner, positive peer effects motivate him to 
increase his number of submissions.  This goes against the negative impact on submissions 
due to the downward revision of the expected monetary earnings.  Also, positive peer effects 
induce the front runner who is aware that he is is ahead to increase or at least maintain his 
number of submissions compared to a front runner not influenced by positive peer effects.10 
This implies that in the T-DF treatment, for a given period 1 output, the period 2 outputs of 
                                                
10 Note that we cannot as easily develop a strategy for identifying negative peer effects. These are predicted to  
lead the underdog to reduce submissions, which is the same that a hypothesis based on no peer effects predicts.   
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underdog and front runners influenced by positive peer effects exceed the outputs of 
underdogs and front runners influenced only by monetary incentives. Moreover, under an 
additional assumption on positive peer effects, which will be maintained below, that the 
marginal cost of period 2 effort is falling in the period 1 output gap, positive peer effects 
imply that the period 2 outputs of underdogs as well as front runners is increasing in the 
period 1 output gap.11  Of course an increase in the number of submissions may not translate 
into an increased score on a one-to-one basis if it is accompanied by a negative quality peer 
effect (some effort is then lost through mistakes).  To sum up:  
Prediction 3A: Suppose there are no peer effects. Then, in the Tournament - Discrete 
Feedback treatment the period 2 submissions and scores of underdogs and frontrunners 
decrease in the period 1 output gap.  In the Tournament - Continuous Feedback treatment, this 
overall negative effect should be stronger since it can manifest itself earlier. 
Prediction 3B: Suppose there are positive peer effects. Then, in the Tournament-Discrete 
Feedback treatment the period 2 number of submissions and scores of underdogs as well as 
front runners increases in the period 1 score gap.   
   A weaker version of Prediction 3B is that the period 2 submissions are not significantly 
affected by the interim gap in scores: both the underdogs and front runners keep working at 
the same pace whatever the score gap.  The same behavioral prediction holds for the 
Continuous Feedback treatment.  Finally, with positive peer effects dropping out should be 
less frequent than in the absence of peer effects, even though the gap in scores is large enough 
to make the outcome of the competition highly predictible. 
Quality peer effects  
In both pay schemes it is possible that a positive peer effect is (partially) outweighed by a 
                                                
11 We thank a referee for drawing our attention to the importance of this assumption. Moreover, as pointed out 
by the referee, this assumption may not be satisfied if closer period 1 outputs (a “closer race”) leads to more 
intense social comparisons.  
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negative quality peer effect.  For example, an agent who lags behind and who is driven by 
comparisons to work harder can at the same time become stressed and anxious, and begin to 
make more mistakes, in which case some of the extra effort is wasted.12  In order to detect a 
quality peer effect in the data we must distinguish it from the peer effect operating on 
submissions.  We propose the following test:  Suppose agents’ submissions, e, are the same in 
any two treatments but the proportion of mistakes, m, in the treatment with more intense 
feedback is larger at the expense of the proportion of scores, s (i.e., m/e is larger and so s/e is 
smaller).  This would provide evidence that increasing feedback on relative performance 
generates a negative quality peer effect.  This gives us the following prediction:  
Prediction 4: In the presence of negative quality peer effects, the proportion of mistakes 
made by the agents who are lagging behind in both pay schemes is the highest in the 
Continuous Feedback treatments and the lowest in the No-Feedback treatments.   
4. RESULTS 
We first study the impact of the pay scheme and feedback rule on aggregate performance 
and on the within-pair differences in performance. We then investigate the presence of peer 
effects.  Finally, we consider quitting decisions.   
4.1. Feedback, incentives, and aggregate performance  
Table 2 shows average scores (number of correct answers), average mistakes (number of 
incorrect answers), and average submissions (the sum of scores and mistakes), and their 
standard deviation.   
(Table 2 about here) 
We first consider the Piece Rate data. As compared with the No Feedback treatment, 
providing the subjects with a discrete feedback does not affect the average score (p=0.970).  
                                                
12
An extreme example of this is the so-called ‘choking under pressure’ phenomenon (Baumeister,1984), where  
an agent’s performance deteriorates when the importance of the task is accentuated.  
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The score is somewhat lower in the Continuous Feedback treatment, but not significantly so 
(p=0.558).13  On average, subjects solve 84 problems in PR-NF and in PR-DF, while they 
only solve 81.5 problems in PR-CF.  The difference in the average number of submissions is 
significantly different neither between the No Feedback rule and the Discrete Feedback rule 
(p=0.939) not between the No Feedback and  the Continuous Feedback rule (p=0.858).  
   In the Tournament pay scheme we find no significant differences in average score across 
the three feedback policies.  The average score is smaller in the Continuous Feedback 
treatment (76.33) than in the No Feedback treatment (80.30), but the difference is not 
significant (p=0.190).  The difference between the average score in the Discrete Feedback 
treatment (75.93) and the No Feedback treatment is also not significant (p=0.230).  The 
difference in the average number of submissions is not significantly different either between 
T-NF and T-DF (p=0.462) or between T-NF and T-CF (p=0.564).    
Result 1: Giving feedback on the scores does not significantly influence the average 
score or submissions in neither the Piece Rate nor the Tournament pay scheme.   
While this result lends support to Prediction 1 against Prediction 2, we must be careful in 
interpreting it.  As already discussed, Prediction 2 assumes that the subjects can increase their 
effort after receiving a feedback, i.e. they have not reached a limit imposed by their ability.  
To investigate the plausibility of this assumption, we ran an additional session for the Piece-
Rate No Feedback treatment where we doubled the piece-rate.14  In this high incentive 
session, with 16 subjects, the average score is 85.56 and the average number of submissions is 
96.89, which can be compared with 84 and 94.86, respectively in the initial data.  The subjects 
work harder in the high incentive session, but the difference is not statistically significant 
(p>0.10).  This indicates that in both cases subjects sought to exert maximum effort, implying 
                                                
13 In the non-parametric statistics reported here, each subject in the PR-NF and T-NF treatments gives one 
independent observation, whereas each pair gives one independent observation in all the other treatments. Unless  
explicitly mentioned otherwise, these tests are Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests.  The p-values for the non 
parametric tests are two-sided. 
14 We thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.  
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that social comparisons, if they exist, cannot increase performance very much.  In other 
words, our data do not allow us to reject the existence of social comparisons in the Piece Rate 
pay scheme since positive peer effects, if they exist, may not be able to significantly influence 
the number of submissions. 
   Are there, for a given feedback rule, significant score differences between the Piece Rate 
and the Tournament pay schemes?  Table 2 shows that for any feedback rule, average scores 
are lower in the Tournament than in the Piece Rate treatment.  For the No (Discrete) 
[Continuous] Feedback rule, the average scores is decreased by 4.4 % (9.6 %) [6.3 %], but 
these differences are not significant (NF: p=0.429, DF: p=0.285, CF: p=0.189).  The same 
applies to the average number of submissions (NF: p=0.188, DF: p=0.256, CF: p=0.145).  A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also rejects the presence of significant differences in the 
distribution of scores between the two pay schemes in the No Feedback (p=0.271), the 
Discrete Feedback (p=398), and the Continuous Feedback rules (p=0.219).15  
   We next consider if there is an impact of feedback on the quality of effort.  For the Piece 
Rate pay scheme the number of mistakes under Continuous Feedback (13.30) is significantly 
higher than under No Feedback (10.86) (p=0.049).  Providing discrete feedback does not 
significantly raise the number of mistakes (p=0.429).  The percentage of mistakes out of total 
submissions increases from 11.45% in PR-NF to 12.59 % in PR-DF, and to 14.03% in PR-CF. 
In the Tournament the number of mistakes under Continuous Feedback (12.17) is 
significantly higher than under No Feedback (9.59) (p=0.005).  Providing feedback halfway 
has no significant influence (p=0.150).  The percentage of mistakes in the number of 
submissions in T-NF, T-DF, and T-CF are 10.67%, 13.01%, and 13.75%, respectively.  This 
                                                
15  It should, however, be mentioned that if we pool together both feedback rules with interim feedback, we find  
significant differences between scores in the Piece Rate and the Tournament pay schemes: the average score is 
lower in the tournament (76.18) than in the Piece Rate pay scheme (82.73) (p=0.086).  The same conclusions 
follow when we focus on the number of sumissions that is lower in the tournament (88.05) than in the Piece Rate 
pay scheme (95.43) (p=0.072). 
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yields Result 2, which supports Prediction 4.  
Result 2: In both the Piece Rate and the Tournament pay schemes the quality of effort is 
significantly lower when subjects receive continuous feedback on their relative score 
than when they receive no feedback.   
Note that the number of mistakes is higher in the Piece Rate than in the Tournament pay 
scheme, but the difference is not significant, neither in the No Feedback treatment (p=0.367), 
nor in the Discrete Feedback (p=0.930) nor in the Continuous Feedback (p=0.761).  Overall, 
regardless of whether pay depends on absolute or relative score, an ongoing comparison with 
co-participants' performance does not affect the quantity of effort but reduces its quality. 
4.2. Feedback, Incentives, and Within-Pair Performance   
We now consider the performance of front runners and underdogs.  In what follows, when we 
report on the final scores, the front runner (underdog) can alternatively be thought of as the 
winner (loser).  Table 3 shows the average scores of the front runner and the underdog in each 
pair, the absolute average within-pair score difference, the average number of mistakes and 
total number of submissions made by the front runner and the underdog, by pay scheme and 
feedback rule. 
(Table 3 about here) 
Table 3  shows that for each pay scheme the average within-pair score difference is larger 
when the subjects are continuously informed about their relative score compared to the two 
other feedback rules.  In the Piece Rate pay scheme with No (Discrete) [Continuous] 
Feedback, the average score differences are 20.28 (22.47) [27.00], respectively.  However, the 
PR-NF treatment does not differ significantly from PR-DF (p=0.827), nor from PR-CF 
(p=0.336).  In Tournaments the difference between the average score gaps of the Continuous 
Feedback and No Feedback treatments (30.17 and 14.68) is highly significant (p=0.003), 
while the difference between the Discrete Feedback and No Feedback treatments (22.00 and 
14.68) is not significant (p=0.269).   
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What gives rise to the increased within-pair score differences when feedback is continuous?  
Table 3 shows that for each pay scheme the average score of the front runners is roughly the 
same across feedback policies (p=0.868 between PR-NF and PR-CF, p=0.628 between T-NF 
and T-CF).  It thus follows that the increasing average score difference in the intensity of 
feedback is due to the underdogs reducing their scores.10   
Result 3: In the Tournament pay scheme the within-pair score difference is significantly 
higher (p=0.003), and the score of the underdogs is significantly lower (p=0.020) under 
the Continuous than under the No Feedback rule.  In the Piece rate treatments, the 
within-pair score gap is not significantly different across feedback rules. 
This lower score of the underdogs can be due either to fewer submissions and/or to an 
increase in the number of mistakes.  Intense feedback on relative performance can discourage 
the subject who is lagging behind, leading to fewer submissions.  Or, it can generate a higher 
level of stress which leads to more mistakes. Which is the most important factor?  Irrespective 
of the pay scheme the average percentage of mistakes of the underdogs is highest under the 
Continuous Feedback rule (18.92 % in PR-CF and 20.41 % in T-CF, compared with 12.45 % 
and 12.49 % in PR-NF and T-NF).  In the Piece-Rate pay scheme the difference between NF 
and CF is significant (p=0.015), but not between NF and DF (p=0.383).  Regarding 
submissions, the underdogs submit on average the same number of answers under each of the 
three feedback rules (84 in PR-NF, 83 in PR-DF, and 84 in PR-CF) (p=0.760 between NF and 
DF, p=0.776 between NF and CF).  Hence the worse scores of the underdogs are mainly due 
to an increase in mistakes and not to a fall in submissions.  
   In the Tournament pay scheme the percentage of mistakes of the underdogs is also 
significantly higher (p<0.001) when feedback is continuous than when no feedback is given. 
Moreover, the average number of submissions by the underdogs is slightly lower when 
                                                
10 Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to find significant differences between the quantile distributions of score 
across treatments in the Piece-Rate pay scheme (p>0.10).  But in the Tournament pay scheme the quantile 
distribution of T-NF differs from both T-DF (p=0.095) and T-CF (p=0.10).  This is attributable to the lowest 
quartile subjects who perform less well in T-CF than in T-NF.  This is consistent with the observation that the 
standard deviations of scores in T-DF (25.91) and T-CF treatments (23.04) are higher than in T-NF (17.12). 
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feedback is given (76.57 in T-DF and 76.96 in T-CF vs. 83.36 in T-NF), but these numbers 
are not significantly different (p=0.338 between NF and DF, p=0.183 between NF and CF).  
The underdogs’ scores fall because mistakes crowd out correct answers, for (roughly) same 
number of submissions. These findings, which support Prediction 4, can be summarized as 
follows.  
Result 4: Providing continuous feedback does not significantly reduce the underdogs' 
number of submissions, but it significantly increases the number of mistakes.  
4.3 Peer Effects and the Dynamics of Submissions  and Quality 
We next analyze the dynamics of submissions and mistakes over time.  Consider first the 
Piece Rate pay scheme.  As stated in Prediction 2, positive (negative) peer effects would 
imply that a subject, who in the PR-DF treatment after 10 minutes learns that he is either 
trailing behind the other subject or is ahead of him, submits more (fewer) answers during the 
second half –10 to 20 minutes – relative to the submissions of similar subjects in the same 
period in PR-NF. Similarly, in PR-CF a subject who is repeatedly informed of his relative 
position should submit more (fewer) answers relative to a similar subject during the same 
period in PR-NF.   
   We construct a ratio relating the number of submissions in the last 10 minutes to the 
number of submissions during the first 10 minutes.16  There is no significant difference in this 
ratio between PR-NF and PR-DF (p=0.458) or PR-CF (p=0.419).  This yields Result 5 which 
supports Prediction 1.   
Result 5: There is no evidence of positive peer effects on the dynamics of submissions in 
the Piece Rate pay scheme. 
   Regarding tournaments, one of our hypotheses for the T-DF treatment is that, in the absence 
of peer effects, the average number of submissions in the second half will be decreasing in the 
                                                
16 We acknowledge that this measure is somewhat arbitrary when used on the Continuous Feedback data, since 
under this rule subjects can continuously adjust their effort.  However, it allows us to compare behavior under 
the Continuous and the Discrete Feedback rules. 
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score difference halfway through the production period (Prediction 3A).  The larger this 
difference, the lower is both the front runner’s and the underdog’s number of submissions.  It 
follows that an indication of positive peer effects in T-DF is a subject who, on having been 
informed on his relative position, either submits more answers (strong version of Prediction 
3B) or does not submit significantly fewer answers (weak version of Prediction 3B) in the 
second half, compared to the submissions of similar subjects in the same period in T-NF.  In 
T-CF, positive peer effects give rise to a similar pattern, where subjects do not submit 
significantly fewer answers than is observed in T-NF.17   
   Comparing the ratio of submissions in the last 10 minutes to submissions during the first 10 
minutes, we find that there is no significant difference between T-NF (mean=1.068) and T-DF 
(mean=1.066; p=0.559), whereas the difference between T- NF and T-CF is close to 
significance (mean = 1.043; p=0.105).  
These non-parametric statistics do not, however, control for the number of submissions 
during the first half of the period and for the score differentials.  To account for this we 
estimate two linear regression models.  In the first, the dependent variable is the ratio of the 
number of submissions in the last 10 minutes to their number in the first 10 minutes.  In the 
second, the dependent variable is the corresponding ratio for mistakes.  The explanatory 
variables include the score after 10 minutes, the subject’s gender, and dummy variables for 
the Discrete and Continuous Feedback treatments, the No Feedback rule being the omitted 
reference category.  We interact these variables with the competitor's gender and score after 
10 minutes.  We hypothesize that the difference in scores with the competitor influences the 
evolution of submissions, and allow this effect to differ for the genders.  The models are 
estimated separately for the underdogs and the front runners; see Table 4.18 
                                                
17 In T-CF, this effect could manifest itself earlier or later as the subjects have several opportunities to adjust 
their behavior.  We analyze effort after 10 minutes to compare with T-DF.  See previous footnote.  
18 We estimated the same models for the Piece Rate treatments.  The results are however omitted from Table 4 
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(Table 4 about here) 
Consider first the underdogs.  Their ratio of submissions is not affected by their own 
intermediate score: whatever their score in the first half of the experiment, they continue to 
submit answers with the same intensity in the second half of the game.  The evolution of 
submissions does not differ in the Discrete Feedback and in the No Feedback treatments, and 
in the Discrete Feedback treatment the underdogs do not adjust their number of submissions 
to the score differentials after ten minutes.  This is not consistent with the strong Prediction 
3B but it is consistent with the weak version of Prediction 3B.  Considering the T-CF 
treatment we find that, controlling for their score in the first half of the game, the underdogs 
adjust their submissions to the score gap, as predicted by Hypothesis 3A.  The regression 
shows also however that, ceteris paribus, they increase their submissions significantly more in 
T-CF than in T-NF.  This could be interpreted as some evidence of peer effects, provided the 
score gap is not too high.  We acknowledge however that the statistical power of this 
regression is quite low. 
   For the Discrete and Continuous Feedback rules we find that, controlling for their score, 
front runners do not adjust their submissions to the distance with the underdogs.  This is 
consistent with the weak Prediction 3B.  This should, however, be qualified when feedback is 
continuous: when the underdog’s score is higher, males’ submissions increase less over time 
than that of females, but the magnitude of this effect is very small.19   
Underdogs make significantly more mistakes in the second half of the game relative to the 
first in T-CF than in T-NF.  Front runners with a higher score after 10 minutes decrease their 
rate of submissions and increase marginally their rate of mistakes in the second half of the 
game.  An interpretation could be that these subjects have exerted an excessively high effort 
                                                                                                                                                   
since no coefficient was significant. This provides further support for Result 5 and Hypothesis 1. 
19 This could be due to different attitudes toward risk (Eckel and Grossman, 2008) or to gender differences in 
overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2001): female front runners may require more distance to the underdogs 
before they feel safe to reduce their own effort.   
 22 
at the beginning of the experiment to maximize their probability to win the tournament and 
they are not able to work at the same pace in the second half of the game, possibly because of 
a fatigue effect.  
These findings yield Result 6, which gives support to the weak Prediction 3B and to 
Prediction 4: 
Result 6: In tournaments we find some evidence of a positive peer effects on the 
evolution of the underdogs' number of submissions and of a negative quality peer effect 
on the evolution of their number of mistakes.  
4.4 Quitting  
We define quitting as permanently stopping to work before the twenty minutes have elapsed. 
There is no rationale for such behavior in a piece rate pay scheme.  But in a tournament, in the 
absence of peer effects, quitting is rational for an underdog when the likelihood of winning 
becomes sufficiently low. For front runners, it is also rational to quit if the underdog has 
dropped out.  
13 subjects of the 14 who were behind halfway in the Tournament - Discrete Feedback 
treatment and 23 of the 24 involved in the Tournament - Continuous Feedback treatment 
eventually lost the competition.  The losers of the tournaments are on average lagging behind 
their competitor during 92.26% of the twenty minutes.  Yet,, in all but one treatment subjects 
work until the 20th minute.  In the T-CF treatment, only 3 subjects quit before the end of the 
game: one person quits at 14'08" and his co-worker responds by quitting at 16'59" (see pair 1 
in Appendix 2), and 17'28" for another winner (see pair 2).  Visually inspecting the dynamics 
of scores in each subject pair of subjects confirms that the subjects almost never drop out even 
when the outcome of the competition is highly predictable (see pair 3 for example).  This also 
rejects Prediction 3A. 
Result 7: In the Tournaments with Discrete and Continuous Feedback both underdogs 
and front runners almost never drop out, even when there seems to be little doubt about 
who will win.  
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Why do so few people quit?  Being ahead may generate a positive peer effect raising 
feelings such as enthusiasm or joy (or spite) from being the best, and this may motivate the 
front runners to continue working, even at a high pace.  Regarding the underdogs, as we do 
not elicit the subject’ beliefs we cannot exclude that those who continued to work actually 
thought they might win.  However, we do not find this a likely explanation: almost all 
underdogs continue to perform the task right to the end, even though the performance gap 
increases (see the performance graphs in Appendix 2).  The lack of quitting is likely due 
partly to peer effects.  The underdogs continue to work even if they are sure to lose, possibly 
in order to avoid unpleasant feelings, such as losing face by being known to give up.  In our 
experiment there is no audience, but the underdog’s competitor learns how much the 
competitor produced compared to his own score at the end of the game.  There may also 
among underdogs be a desire to maintain a self-image as someone who never gives up and 
who always does one’s best. Future work should seek to carefully disentangle these effects 
and evaluate their relative magnitude.  
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We use a real-effort experiment to investigate the efficiency of various relative performance 
feedback systems under a piece rate and a tournament pay schemes.  We find that releasing 
interim feedback on relative performance does not improve performance under either pay 
scheme.  Under a piece-rate pay scheme agents’ outcomes are not affected by performance 
comparisons.  In tournaments with continuous feedback people adjust their submissions to the 
performance of others less than they would do if they were only motivated by monetary 
considerations.  But since giving feedback is usually costly for the organization, our 
conclusion is, therefore, that it may be more profitable not to provide interim feedback on 
relative performance whatever the pay scheme in use. 
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On the other hand, if the agents are able to compare by themselves their own performance to 
that of their co-workers, the tournament pay scheme benefits from the presence of positive 
peer effects.  Indeed, we have found that the underdogs do not give up even when the gap 
with their competitor is large enough to make the result of the tournament predictable, and 
consequently the front runners do not systematically slack off.  Therefore, under these 
feedback rules peer effects make the tournament more efficient than expected.  
The existence of peer effects has been documented for flat wage schemes (Falk and Ichino, 
2006 and Mas and Moretti, 2009).  We do not find evidence of positive peer effects when 
subjects are paid under a piece rate pay scheme.  There are two possible explanations. First, it 
may be that positive peer effects are present but people in general work at their maximum 
level of effort under a piece-rate scheme, even under no feedback, and so positive peer effects 
due to feedback cannot manifest themselves in a strong and easily observable way. Our 
experiment provides some support for this being the case. Second, peer effects may be less 
prevalent in a piece rate pay scheme because this scheme focuses the attention on the direct 
monetary return from each additional unit of effort, leading people to disregard other 
dimensions of the environment such as performance comparisons.  Our experiment cannot 
fully separate these two explanations, and further experimental work seem important. 
Another important finding is based on the observation that while continuous feedback does 
not lead the front runners to slack off in tournaments, it significantly reduces the score of the 
underdogs.  This negative impact, also observed in the piece-rate scheme, is not due to a 
reduction in their quantity of effort but to a decrease in the quality of their effort.  We refer to 
this as a negative quality peer effect.  This indicates that when an organization also cares 
about the performance and the quality of work of the less able agents, it should not implement 
a continuous feedback system, whatever the performance-pay mode.  Our interpretation of 
this is that the output comparisons allowed by feedback generate stress and anxiety that 
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reduce the quality of effort.  This is similar to how increased conscious attention to implicit 
competition, cash incentives, or the presence of an audience can reduce performance, as 
emphasized in the “choking under pressure” literature (Baumeister, 1984; Ariely et al., 2009; 
Dohmen, 2008).  An alternative interpretation could be that mistakes are primarily due to the 
distraction or disruption created by intense feedback. That is, it is not the content of feedback 
but feedback itself that lowers quality. While continuous feedback can in general disrupt 
subjects' concentration we do not believe that it can explain the data, in particular the finding 
that feedback affects underdogs and front runners differently.  These findings can on the other 
hand be explained by the quality peer effect.   
Another noteworthy finding of our study is that dropping-out from the competition is rare. 
Both front runners and underdogs continue to exert high effort even when the distance 
between them is so large that it seems certain that the underdog cannot catch up, that is, when 
the marginal benefit of effort is null.  We offer several explanations.  First, people are 
motivated by the competition in itself, in which case the underdogs attempt to minimize the 
score difference relative to their competitor whereas the front runners try to maximize this 
difference.  Second, as also discussed by Fershtman and Gneezy (2005), a social norm (‘one 
should never give up’, ‘always do your best’) may be at work.  Third, ego (personal ambition 
activated by the joy of winning, self-esteem or self-image) is another source of motivation 
that could induce some subjects to attempt to maximize their score even when there are no 
more monetary incentives to do so. 
Our study provides new evidence on the impact of feedback on relative performance on 
effort by using a particular task.  Our laboratory experiment uses a specific and non-smooth 
substitution technology between performing the task and taking leisure on the job. Also, we 
captured the notion of the quality of effort in a very simple binary way. Of course, the output 
from many real life production processes are characterised by a much finer measure of 
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quality.  It would therefore be useful to replicate our setup in other environments before 
drawing general conclusions.  Many other extensions of our study can also be thought of, in 
particular manipulating the ability composition of groups to test more precisely whether more 
homogenous teams are better able to generate positive peer effects than heterogenous teams, 
or investigating the importance of peer effects in quitting decisions. 
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Table 1. The treatments  
 
Treatment Payments Feedback on 
co-player’s 
score 
# of 
sessions 
# of  
subjects 
Piece Rate – No Feedback (PR-NF) 
Tournament – No Feedback (T-NF) 
Piece Rate – Discrete Feedback (PR-DF) 
Tournament – Discrete Feedback (T-DF) 
Piece Rate – Continuous Feedback (PR-CF) 
Tournament– Continuous Feedback (T-CF) 
! 0.1 per unit output 
!17 or !0 
! 0.1 per unit output 
!17 or !0 
! 0.1 per unit output 
!17 or !0 
After 20’ 
After 20’ 
After 10' and 20' 
After 10' and 20' 
Throughout  
Throughout  
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
28 
44 
30 
28 
30 
48 
Note: ‘output’ denotes the number of correctly added sets of numbers. 
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Table 2. Average and standard deviation of scores, mistakes, and submissions  
 
Score Mistakes Submissions Treatments 
Mean  St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
 
PR-NF (28) 
PR-DF (30) 
PR-CF (30) 
Average (88) 
 
84.00 
83.97 
81.50 
83.14 
 
20.79 
24.62 
24.40 
23.15 
 
10.86 
12.10 
13.30 
12.11 
 
7.63 
11.24 
7.25 
8.87 
 
94.86 
96.07 
94.80 
95.25 
 
19.52 
26.59 
20.88 
22.35 
 
T-NF (44) 
T-DF (28) 
T-CF (48) 
Average (120) 
 
80.30 
75.93 
76.33 
77.69 
 
17.12 
25.91 
23.04 
21.72 
 
9.59 
11.36 
12.17 
11.03 
 
6.28 
5.84 
6.61 
6.37 
 
89.89 
87.29 
88.50 
88.72 
 
15.02 
26.03 
21.67 
20.54 
Note: The number of observations by treatment is given in parentheses.  
 31 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics on within-pair scores, mistakes, and submissions  
 Average score Average mistakes Average submissions 
Treatment Front runner Underdog 
Wwithin-
pair score 
difference 
 
Front runner Underdog Front runner Underdog 
PR-NF  
 
PR-DF 
 
PR-CF 
 
Average  
94.14  
(16.39) 
95.20  
(22.49) 
95.00  
(20.06) 
94.80  
(19.42) 
73.86  
(20.19) 
72.73  
(21.90) 
68.00 
(20.98) 
71.48 
 (20.72) 
20.28 
(16.53) 
22.47 
(17.96) 
27.00  
(16.93) 
23.32  
(17.00) 
11.21 
(4.66) 
 13.93  
(14.99) 
10.73  
(4.61) 
11.98  
(9.42) 
10.50  
(9.94) 
10.27  
(5.47) 
15.87 
(8.58) 
12.25  
(8.40) 
105.35 
(15.04) 
109.13 
(25.60) 
105.73 
(18.48) 
106.77 
(19.90) 
84.36 
(18.11) 
83.00 
(21.06) 
83.87 
(17.49) 
83.73 
(18.53) 
T-NF  
 
T-DF 
 
T-CF  
Average  
87.64  
(14.76) 
86.93  
(23.78) 
91.42  
(18.15) 
88.98  
(18.29) 
72.95  
(16.40) 
64.93  
(23.84) 
61.25  
(16.74) 
66.40  
(18.91) 
14.68 
(14.04) 
22.00  
(19.01) 
30.17  
(21.16) 
22.58 
 (19.26) 
8.77  
(5.46) 
11.07  
(5.88) 
8.63 
 (5.01) 
9.25 
 (5.39) 
10.41 
 (7.05) 
11.64 
 (6.01) 
15.71  
(6.16) 
12.82  
(6.81) 
96.41 
(12.39) 
98.00 
(24.69) 
100.05 
(18.19) 
98.23 
(17.90) 
83.36 
(14.81) 
76.57 
(23.45) 
76.96 
(18.73) 
79.22 
(18.61) 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.  
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Table 4.  Determinants of the evolution of submissions and mistakes in Tournaments  
Ratio of submissions in the last 10’ 
to submissions in the first 10’ 
Ratio of mistakes in the last 10’ to 
mistakes in the first 10’ 
 
Dependent variable 
Underdog Front runner Underdog Front runner 
Own score after 10 minutes 
 
Male 
 
 
Discrete Feedback treatment (DF) 
 
Competitor’s score after 10’ in DF  
 
Male*Competitor’s score after 10’ in 
DF 
 
Continuous Feedback treatment (CF) 
 
Competitor’s score after 10’ in CF 
 
Male*Competitor’s score after 10’ in 
CF 
Constant 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.062) 
 
-0.002 
(0.162) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.395*** 
(0.143) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
1.002*** 
(0.095) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.041 
(0.038) 
 
-0.031 
(0.086) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.002 
(0.075) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
1.322*** 
(0.061) 
0.064*** 
(0.020) 
0.454 
(0.529) 
 
1.265 
(1.363) 
-0.009 
(0.031) 
0.000 
(0.020) 
 
2.592** 
(1.203) 
-0.050* 
(0.026) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
-1.116 
(0.809) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.330 
(0.441) 
 
1.837* 
(1.006) 
-0.044 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
 
0.514 
(0.877) 
-0.031 
(0.033) 
-0.001 
(0.021) 
0.066 
(0.724) 
Number of observations 
Adjusted R2 
60 
0.010 
60 
0.459 
58 
0.145 
59 
0.023 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  We have fewer observations in the analysis of mistakes than in the analysis of 
submissions because 3 subjects did not make any mistake.  
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Appendix 1. The screen in the Piece Rate-Continuous Feedback treatment 
(translated from French) 
 
 
 
INCORRECT 
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 Appendix 2. Evolution of performance over time in the Tournament-Continuous 
Feedback treatment  
 
The figures below display the evolution of the scores of the two members of three different pairs of subjects 
minute by minute. The X-axis measures time (from the first to the 20th minute). The Y-axis measures the score. 
In the first figure below, the underdog stops working after 14 minutes, followed by the frontunner after 16 
minutes.  In the second figure, the front runner stops working after 17 minutes but the underdog keeps working 
until the last minute. The third figure displays a much more frequent situation in which both competitors keep 
working until the very end of the game although the final outcome seems easy to predict at an early stage. The 
figures for  all the other pairs are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
